As Operation Moshtarak continues at this very moment it is pertinent to once again draw our attention to the tactics being deployed on the ground in Afghanistan. The spotlight has recently been on the political attempts to bring stable government to the country in the form of President Karzai’s premiership but the foundations of this will truly be built by the military actions of the ISAF. It is this need that has brought about Operation Moshtarak. With time running out before the withdrawal of troops begins, large offensives will be the order of the day in an attempt to create a legacy of stability from which the West-backed Karzai can act.

While it is all too easy to scrutinize and criticize tactics from the safety of our homes, there needs to be a realization of what lies ahead. However, simultaneously, the ISAF forces need to take action and snatch the initiative. Inaction would be just as deadly and allow the Taliban to seize upon this passivity. It is this conflict of ideas, along with numerous other factors, that causes the current situation inside the country to be so precarious.

This is coupled with the recent reports that Tehran’s influence has been growing in recent months. Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have been reported as supplying equipment and training to the Taliban forces. While many have tried to downplay this suggestion, the recent capturing of various pieces of arms suggests otherwise and as the Sunday Times reported last week, Iranian security officials are teaching militants to attack checkpoints, mountain bases and convoys, as well as plant deadly roadside bombs. Despite Tehran’s, at best, patchy relationship with the Taliban, they are willing to lend a hand in what they see as an ideal opportunity to continue to divert NATO attention away from Iran’s fractious dealings with the West. They have already experience of this type from the conflict in Iraq as well, where they were instrumental in supplying insurgents with explosives.

Regardless of many people’s foolhardy assumption that the Taliban are a rabble that can easily be quashed with force, they are extremely adept at reading and reacting to the ISAF’s tactics. As has been the case in previous years, the Taliban will more than likely consolidate their weakened position and then launch an offensive during the summer months, their preferred time to fight. With the aid of foreign supplies, together with a seemingly endless supply of willing combatants, the Taliban are far from being suppressed. Operation Moshtarak, once done and dusted, may well result in a similar ending to the British led Panther’s Claw operation of last summer: A success, but one that did little to severely reduce the ability of the Taliban to engage with the ISAF and Afghan army at a later date.

There is also the ever-present conundrum of the mountainous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In particular, the area extending from South Waziristan to the northern reaches of the North Western Frontier. This geographical quandary can never be solved, despite the Pakistanis bowing to U.S pressure to allow greater access and the numbers of operations conducted. It is from this area that the Taliban will always have a foothold in the country from which to recuperate and launch renewed attacks on areas previously deemed as freed from the yoke of Taliban oppression.

As such, unless a drastic and highly aggressive policy is used against the Taliban the ISAF will never fully suppress them. They have had 30 years of practice at fighting this kind of war and they will continue to fight on for the foreseeable future.

Therefore, the plan for a withdrawal in the coming 12 months appears to be the logical solution. The real question is whether the ISAF can prepare an infrastructure and train an army to maintain the position that they are currently in within the restrictive time frame.

Canada has already paid a heavy price for the war and would be wise to hold dear the agreement to withdraw by next year despite the position they leave Afghanistan in. Unlike the U.S and U.K, Canada does not have the same level of political commitment and should cherish this. The recent military developments within Afghanistan are being brandished as proof of success. While this may be true in isolation, there is a worrying sense that stagnation will return once the Taliban rally come the summer. They may not win but neither will they lose. For Canada and the rest of the ISAF this is not an outcome that will suffice, but one that may have to be accepted.

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